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RUMINATIONS RE REFORM OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(ESPECIALLY OUR GUILTY PLEA
SYSTEM): REFLECTIONS DERIVED
FROM A STUDY OF THE FRENCH
SYSTEM
George W. Pugh"*
Dissatisfaction with the administration of criminal justice in the United States is everywhere evident; the persuasive powers of a Roscoe Pound are unneeded to establish it.'
On this point, at least, the black militant, disaffected youth,
police officer, and "law and order" advocate all agree, despite
their differing as to both the bases of complaint and the tenor
2
of remedy urged.
Although subject to vitriolic criticism, administration of
criminal justice in the United States is today by no means
necessarily worse than it was fifteen or twenty years ago.
However, because of socio-economic unrest and the increase
in violent crime, the country is rightfully far more sensitive
to the system's shortcomings. Since modern industrial
societies generally share the same problems, the experiences
of other countries should be considered as we seek further to
reform our own. 3
The French criminal justice system is somewhat of a prototype of those prevailing in continental Europe and it is
submitted that much can be derived from a study of it. 4 In* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The writer wishes to

express sincere appreciation to C. Frank Holthaus and Aub A. Ward for
research assistance in connection with the preparation of this article. This
article is also to be published in a festschrift for Dean Dimitri Constantopoulos, Law School, University of Thessaloniki, Greece.
1. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration

of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
2. The disenchantment is perhaps less prevalent among members of the
legal profession, for having lived rather intimately with the system's
shortcomings, we have tended to accept and accommodate ourselves to them.
3. See Mueller, Lessons of Comparative Criminal Procedure, 15 AMERICAN U. L. REV. 341 (1966), reprinted in MUELLER, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 241 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MUELLER].

4. The writer has had the opportunity to observe the French system
first-hand on several occasions, having spent the summers of 1962 and 1964 in
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stead of here attempting a detailed analysis or evaluation of
the French system as it functions in France, 5 the writer proposes instead to use the French system as a point de d6part for
ruminations re reform of our own. Hence, what is here attempted is in no sense an evaluation of the French criminal
justice system or its various procedural devices; rather, the
writer will try to ascertain what relevance certain aspects of
the French system might have for reflecting on the American
system. Whether or not a particular French institution works
well in France, it nevertheless can properly stimulate insights about corresponding American institutions, and it is in
this sense that the following remarks about the French system are offered. Rather than attempting to suggest specific
changes for immediate implementation, the writer has the
temerity (perhaps seeing through a glass darkly) to propose,
for consideration, broader long-range directional changes.
GUILT ASCERTAINMENT UNDER THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM: THEORY AND PRACTICE

In theory, the guilt or innocence of an accused in our
system is to be determined at the trial. It is there that the
defendant is accorded those major protective safeguards
which characterize our system and are seen by us to validate
the verdict-the presumption of innocence, right of confrontation and compulsory process, right to counsel, the jury,
privilege against self-incrimination, etc. Realistically analyzed, however, in the light of how our system really functions today, is this an accurate perception? It has been reported that approximately 80 to 95 percent of convictions are
obtained as the result not of trials but of guilty pleas, 6 and
guilty pleas are usually the result (either explicitly or implicitly) of plea bargains, or to use a nicer phrase-"plea discussions. ' '7 It is therefore only in a very small percentage of
France as a Fellow of the Comparative Study of the Administration of Justice, and the spring semester of 1973-74 on sabbatical leave there.
5. For a discussion of how the French criminal system works in practice,

see Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory
Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV. 1 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Pugh], and materials
therein cited.
6. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Burger]; see also NEWMAN, CONVICTION 241 (1966).
7. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPILATION 301 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].

1976]

RUMINATIONS: CRIMINAL JUSTICE

949

our total cases that guilt is in fact determined by a trial, with
all of its vaunted traditional safeguards protecting against an
unjust conviction. Therefore, guilt is often determined by
negotiation between defense counsel and the district attorney
in light of the risks each must face if he undergoes the uncertainties of a trial.
Until quite recently, the validity of convictions obtained
by plea bargaining was constitutionally suspect;8 the process
is still often sub rosa and the subject of much criticism among
the public and the police. 9 However the institution was recently enthusiastically embraced by both the American Bar
Association 1 ° and the United States Supreme Court." Chief
Justice Burger has warned of the evils that would befall the
system if the guilty plea ratio were decreased. 1 2 He noted that
a decrease of approximately 10 percent would practically
double the number of trials, with a concomitant impact on the
number of jurors, prosecutors, courtrooms, etc.
In the French system, however great its failings in other
areas, the guilty plea problem is generally unknown. With a
minor exception, 13 a defendant willing to admit guilt cannot
thereby preclude or forego public trial. Thus there is generally no guilty plea available to short cut the system. The
absence of the guilty plea is more comprehendible when it is
realized that the trial in France is a much shorter, less expensive, less time-consuming institution than our own.
8. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Shelton v. United States,
246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957); see also Pugh, Standards Relating to Pleas of

Guilty, 57 F.R.D. 229, 359 (1972).
9. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals, in its Standard 3.1 on the Courts, p. 46 (1973), proposed the abolition of
prosecutorial concession via guilty plea negotiation "as soon as possible, but
in no event later than 1978."
10. ABA STANDARDS at 301.
11. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 261 (1971); North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970). In Santobello, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Burger, stated: "The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between
the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is
an essential component of the administration of justice," and "[d]isposition of
charges after plea discussion is not only an essential part of the process but a
highly desirable part for many reasons." See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, as
amended July 31, 1975, Pub. L. 94-64, § 3(5)-(10), 89 Stat. 371, 372.
12. Burger at 931.
13. See discussion in text at note 90, infra.
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Further, the French trial serves the very valuable and much
needed function of a pre-sentence hearing. Pre-trial investigation is much more complete, and pre-trial discovery and
disclosure far more extensive.
The writer is not contending that in the present context
plea bargaining and the guilty plea in the United States serve
no useful purpose. To the contrary, it is submitted that under
existing conditions, the negotiated plea must be retained, and
I applaud the courage and openness of the American Bar
Association 14 and the United States Supreme Court 1 5 in recognizing the institution and prescribing safeguards. However, if the existing structure is to be retained, it is submitted
that much more regulation and judicial participation in the
process is needed. Further, it is believed that an alternative
to the present system should be considered. In addition, the
entire process (trial and pre-trial) should be revitalized so
that we are not forced to rely so heavily upon guilty pleas. It
is proposed, therefore, that in this article we first examine
ways of expediting and improving existing trial, pre-trial, and
appellate procedures, and thereafter consider an alternative
to the existing plea bargaining institution.
IMPARTIAL GOVERNMENTAL

INVESTIGATION

AND FULL DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS

The adversary system in its proper sphere (the courtroom) is a magnificent institution. In light of the arguments
hereafter developed, however, it is submitted that the adversary concept has somehow extended itself much too pervasively into the criminal investigation area. A different approach than the present to criminal investigation, it is believed, should be taken.
Governmental investigation of crime should strive to be
impartialin character, i.e., it should be apart from the adversary process. So envisioned, its aim would be to turn up all
pertinent facts, those favorable to the defense as well as the
prosecution; then, insofar as possible, the results of such investigation would be made available to both the prosecution
and the defense. 1 6
14. ABA STANDARDS at 301.
15. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 261 (1971). See note 11,
supra.
16. See in this connection Chief Justice Weintraub's discussion in State v.
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An historic mission of the police is to investigate crime.
Despite the fact that the prosecution traditionally has full
access to the results of police investigation, prosecutorial authorities have often found it desirable to develop supplemen17
tal investigative forces of their own.
Despite the availability today of broader discovery,' and
much greater obligations on the part of the prosecution to
disclose,' 9 it is still very difficult for the defense to ascertain
what evidence, favorable and unfavorable, has been turned
up by the police and the prosecution in their investigation of
a case. Defense counsel have therefore naturally felt it advisable to conduct as extensive an investigation on their own as
can be afforded. Because of the usual poverty of persons
accused of crime, however, investigation by the defense tends
to be minimal in the average run of cases. Defendants, however, are gaining investigative and scientific support, 20 for
the spirit of Gideon v. Wainwright2' promised and is achieving
far greater results than its mere holding-and it portends
much more. Gideon's progeny have vastly multiplied the
number of indigents entitled to representation. No longer, as
in pre-Gideon days, is a person often to be told of his right to
counsel only if, without benefit of counsel, he has the temerity
to plead "not guilty. '22 Now no indigent may be jailed for an
Tate, 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12 (1966); Goldstein, The State and the Accused:
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
17. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ,AW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 72 (1967).
18. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, as amended 89 Stat. 374 (1975), effective
December 1, 1975.
19. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
20. See in this regard 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Of particular interest is subsection (e) which allows an indigent defendant to obtain investigative, expert
and other services upon a proper showing of need.
21. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. See, e.g., State v. Hilaire, 216 La. 972, 978, 45 So. 2d 360, 362 (1950)
wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court said: "For us to hold otherwise at this
time, after the several courts of this state have been accepting pleas of guilty
on arraignment without assigning counsel to the accused under the practice
and procedure long prevailing, would only serve as an avenue for the release
of a majority of the inmates of the Louisiana State Penitentiary who are now
serving under pleas of guilty.
We therefore conclude that the defendant, having been convicted and
sentenced on his own plea, without suggestion to the trial judge that he
needed or wanted the assistance of counsel in making said plea, was not
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offense, misdemeanor or felony, unless he has validly waived
his constitutional right to counsel. 23 It is submitted further
that under the present system, for there to be adequate protection of indigent defendants, the indigent should be ac24
corded meaningful investigative and scientific assistance.
The full ambit of an indigent's rights in this connection are as
yet by no means clear, but if the pattern continues, we will
have three comprehensive investigative forces (that of the
police, the prosecution, and the defense) all generally conducted at public expense-certainly a questionable allocation
of societal resources. Instead of these three investigations, a
single, impartial governmental investigation in the main
should suffice.
What the writer advocates is different in concept from
recent salutary developments in the United States towards
25
greater discovery. Urging a variation on the French system,
the writer proposes that governmental investigation of a
crime be impartial-something apart from the adversary process. Under this approach, the governmental officer charged
with investigating a crime would be responsible for investigating all aspects of it, and all investigators would be required to keep full and complete records of every inquiry
made. When a person is charged with a crime, both prosecution and defense would have access to the reports incidental
to the investigation. During the course of further investigation both sides would be authorized to suggest (and when
appropriate, insist upon) other lines of inquiry. In exceptional
cases, under specific situations and subject to judicial supervision, certain aspects of the investigation might be subject to
less than full disclosure, but such limitation on the rights of
completely full disclosure are already part of our law. 26 The
deprived of his liberty without due process because of the failure of the
minutes to show that no counsel was appointed to represent him."
23. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The Louisiana constitution
goes even further, providing that an indigent is entitled to counsel in any
case "punishable" by imprisonment. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
24. Goldstein at 1192. See comment in note 20, supra.
25. For a discussion of criminal investigations under the French system,
see Pugh at 1; Anton, L'Instruction Criminelle, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 441, 443
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Anton]; Larguier, The Preliminary Investigation
by the French Juge d'Instruction, 19 No. IRE. L.Q. 32 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Larguier].
26. F.R. CRIM. P. 16.
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role of the attorney, both as prosecutor and as defense counsel, then would return more to the traditional position-that
2 of the advocate presenting his side of the case at trial
developing his case largely on the basis of facts initially
turned up by this impartial investigation. Under this approach both prosecutor and defense counsel would still be free
to make further investigations, but there would be less necessity for same, and the system should strive towards achieving
a full initial impartial investigation that would be worthy of
reliance by both sides.
The French aim towards achieving such an impartial investigation, and it seems to this observer, do so amazingly
well. When an offense is reported, the police commence an
inquest, making a full and detailed report of each interrogation and investigation. In more serious and complex cases,
investigation is thereafter under the direction of an examining magistrate, as hereafter discussed. Whether or not in the
United States we ultimately embrace the notion of the examining magistrate, 2 the police, it is submitted, should be
charged with making broad, impartial investigation of offenses and having their records and reports of such investigations available to both sides. Perhaps for anything like the
proposed plan to work effectively we would need to develop a
system of investigating magistrates 29 to be in charge of the
investigation, and this notion will be further explored later in
this article.
We Americans may be much too steeped in our own past
fully to adopt such an approach. It is believed, however, that
we should consciously aim towards some such full and complete impartial governmental investigation. In any event, it is
submitted that such an impartial investigative approach
could now be fully adopted relative to our crime laboratories
and scientific investigations. The personnel conducting such
investigations are presumably experts, and the fruits of their
labors should be available alike to the prosecution and the
defense.
The proposal for an impartial investigative system, if
adopted, would greatly reduce the expense to the public of
27. See POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 98
(1953); POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 190-96 (1895); Pugh
at 1.
28. See MUELLER at 29.
29. See id.
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criminal investigation. Instead of society's financing three
investigative forces-the police, the prosecution, and the
defense-there would generally be only one, and that one an
expert, comprehensive, impartial governmental investigation.
There would be a further benefit as to guilty pleas. Today,
because of our sometimes inadequate investigative facilities,
and the absence of full discovery and disclosure, the defendant is frequently unaware of what the prosecution knows or
will learn. If there were adequate investigation before trial,
and the results of same were made available to the defendant,
often a guilty man subject to such an effective, exhaustive
investigation would choose to admit his complicity and attempt to secure the most favorable treatment possible. 30 More
about this will be said later in the article.
UPGRADING, INTEGRATING AND COORDINATING POLICE WORK

To combat present-day crime and to conduct the kind of
investigations suggested above, I am persuaded that we need
a far more effective police force-one more integrated, coordinated and efficient. To control it, however, we will need
many more safeguards. The French police force is a
thoroughly trained, highly organized, completely centralized
organization of professionals. I have great respect for its efficiency, but am frightened by its power. The French apparently have concluded that, to deal with crime, a very strong
police force is needed: to control this force, they have de31
veloped a very detailed regulatory, administrative scheme.
Our criminal justice system, I believe, has been shaped
and molded by our profound fear of governmental power, and
hence we have shied away from the creation of strong, centralized, professional police forces-state or national. Under
the stimulation of necessity, it is true that on the national
scene we have relatively recently in our history established
and developed the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 32 Its
30. See Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53
A.B.A.J. 732, 733 (1967).
31. See PARRA, TRAITE DE PROCADURE PENALE POLICIERE (1960); CODE
DE PROCEDURE PENALE, arts. 12 et seq. (Dalloz ed. 1974-1975). For an English
translation see KOCK, THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1964).

32. The Bureau of Investigation was created administratively within the
Department of Justice in 1908. The agency was designated the Federal
Bureau of Investigation by the Act of March 22, 1935, ch. 39, title II, 49 Stat.
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ambit of authority, however, is, of course, limited to crimes
against federal law. 33 Also, under the stimulation of necessity, our large cities have developed professional police forces,
34
but this too has been a relatively recent phenomenon. Outside the metropolitan areas our police are still often relatively
untrained individuals under the direct control of a popularly
elected sheriff or politically appointed chief of police.3 5 The
pressure for "home rule" of the police is very strong, 36 reflect77. The agency is presently provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 531. See M. LOWENTHAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (1950).
33. For discussion of the jurisdiction of the FBI, see M. LOWENTHAL,
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 414-24 (1950).
34. In the 19th Century a number of states experimented with establishing state controls over the police forces of the largest cities within their
jurisdictions. This approach, however, was shortly thereafter abandoned in
favor of local control. See FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS 58-159 (reprint ed. 1969); LEONARD & MORE, THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33-59 (1967). As late as 1931, the National Commission of Law
Observance and Enforcement, (the Wickersham Commission) stated in its
REPORT ON THE POLICE: "Proper qualifications, careful selection, scientific
training, thorough police schooling, certain tenure of office, singly or together seem total strangers in the majority of our departments. They embrace the whole gamut of police work and raise the phantom of inefficiency to
a creature of utter administrative laxity." Id. at 53-54.
35. In this connection, Leonard and More state: "Sheriffs' offices haye
always been the scene of a rapid turnover in personnel, primarily as a result
of the concept of rotation in office. Some jurisdictions limit tenure to a
specified number of terms while other jurisdictions do not allow the incumbent to succeed himself. This constant change of leadership has had a detrimental effect on the development of most sheriffs' departments as effective
and efficient law enforcement agencies.
Efforts to remove the position of sheriff from the political arena have
been unsuccessful and until this is done, it will serve as a barrier to professionalization of the sheriff's office. In the majority of states, the sheriff
functions as the chief law enforcement officer of the county. Such responsibilities as this require a type of leadership which cannot be found in many
departments.
Political aspirants to the position of sheriff seldom have the training,
.education, or aptitude which is required for such a position. In many departments, politics permeates the whole system and when the sheriff leaves
office, there is a complete change of personnel. Partisan politics creates many
problems for a sheriffs department?' LEONARD & MORE, THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 42 (1967). See also B. SMITH, POLICE
SYSTEMSIN THE UNITED STATES 7, 8, 71-72 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
SMITH].
36. See SMITH at 4; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE POLICE 124 (1931); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 109 (1967).
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ing perhaps our citizenry's deep-rooted fear of centralized
power, especially police power. The writer shares this fear of
concentrated police power, very apprehensive as to whether
we in America would be able to develop sufficient controls to
make it responsive to the wishes of a democratic free society.
Watergate and recent disclosures of CIA and FBI activity, of
course, heighten this fear. On the other hand, it must in
frankness be recognized that there is an inherent contradiction between effective investigation of crime in today's complex mobile society, and localized, often non-professional
police forces. On balance, the writer is persuaded that we
need a more integrated, centralized, professional police, and
this is the direction in which we have been moving, but concomitant with it we need far more significant regulation and
control. Under the stimulus of events and in light of inducements offered by Washington, 37 we have greatly expanded
and improved police training and developed means of informal integration and cooperation among the various police
forces throughout the state and country. The progress in this
connection, it is submitted, will and should continue. Although our police should continue to be under state and local
supervision and control, the writer submits that there must
be yet greater integration and overall direction of the police
system at the state level. Further, satisfactory means should
be developed on an administrative basis to control abuse of
police authority and redress grievances, measures that were
not as essential in an earlier, simpler day.
The French, and many other continental countries, have
had the phenomenon of a strong centralized police force for a
great many years. 3 The vicissitudes of change and socioeconomic unrest have probably necessitated it. Reflective of
39
these changes, France has had ten constitutions since 1804.
37. In 1968 Congress created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration by Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
82 Stat. 197 et seq. For a discussion of this program, see Caplan, Reflections on
the Nationalizationof Crime, 1964-1968, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORDER 583. See also
Note, A Reexamination of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (1975).
38. For a discussion of Sir Robert Peel's efforts, beginning in 1829, towards adoption of his scheme for a unified professional police force for England, see 4 RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 158-207
(1968).
39. See DAVID & DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 146 (1958).
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The writer is not at all urging that we adopt as strong and
centralized a police system as the French. 40 The writer does
suggest, however, that we can learn much from the tight
regulatory schemes that the French and others have developed over many years to control a strong police force.
Concededly, at times their control mechanism has been faulty
and their police have become much too strong-even for continental taste, but these experiences too can be instructive.
We can profitably consider mechanisms they may thereafter
have developed to check such abuse of power and prevent its
recurrence.
Efforts by the courts, such as Mapp v. Ohio,41 Miranda v.
Arizona,42 etc., salutary though they may be, to impose judicial standards upon the police have by no means been
sufficiently effective to provide the day-to-day regulation and
control that is needed for a free society and modern, effective
police force to co-exist. 43 Study of the French may here be
very helpful. If our police force is effectively to be controlled,
we must have far more meaningful internal administrative
regulations and sanctions.
THE SCREENING PROCESS

Traditionally in our system it has been the grand jury
which has determined whether or not, at least as to all serious offenses, a suspect is to be put to trial. Historically it can
act either on its own initiative or on suggestion of the prosecutor," and in exercising its authority it possesses broad
40. For a splendid, detailed and chilling discussion of the organization,
practices, and powers of the French police until the last half of the 19th
century, see 3 RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 539-74

(1957). Radzinowicz states at 539: "By the year 1760, when London could
muster hardly a dozen professional policemen, Paris had long grown accustomed to a surveillance so rigorous that to live without it seemed almost
inconceivable."
41. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. See Gorecki, Miranda and Beyond-The Fifth Amendment Reconsidered, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 295; Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the
Police Organization, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 467 (1971); Wilson and Alprin, Controlling Police Conduct: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 36
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 488 (1971). See also Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
44. 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 213 at 464-69 (12th ed. 1974); I
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investigatory powers. The efficacy and desirability of the
grand jury in today's society is still much debated, 45 but it is
this writer's conclusion that the grand jury as it functions
today is generally unsatisfactory both as an independent
body supposedly protecting the citizen from the long arm of
the overzealous prosecutor, and as an independent investigatory and accusatorial agency.
The role historically assigned the grand jury is extremely
important, however, and one naturally casts about for a possible alternative-an agency or institution that would be an
independent impartial investigative and accusatorial organ,
and adequately protect against abuse of prosecutorial discretion. As an alternative to the grand jury indictment, many
states permit the prosecutor on his own information to put a
person on trial, with the preliminary examination or preliminary hearing as the buffer. 46 It is submitted that the preliminary examination as we know it in the United States is an
insufficient safeguard for the suspect; it tends to be somewhat of a rubber stamp of the prosecutor's prior decision to
47
prosecute, much as the grand jury itself has come to be.
Arguably, this may be attributable in part to a feeling by
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 101 at 150-52

(1969).
45. A plethora of material has been written on the grand jury. For
bibliographical data see Bibliography of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
867-78 (1972), and J. LUBBERS, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE GRAND
JURY (1973). For current controversial Congressional proposals relative to
the grand jury, see the Grand Jury Reform Act, H.R. 1277, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975). For ABA reaction to the same, see Resolution 101B of the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association (August 1975). See also Frankel
& Naftalis, The Grand Jury, An Institution on Trial, THE NEW LEADER (Nov.
10, 1975).
46. For a discussion distinguishing preliminary hearing or examination
as here used from the judicial proceeding to determine probable cause for
arrest, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and Note 36 LA. L. REV. 1050
(1976). The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 expressly provides that, "The right
to a preliminary examination shall not be denied in felony cases except when
the accused is indicted by a grand jury." LA. CONST. art. I, § 14. For a
discussion of this provision, see Hargrave, Declaration of Rights of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 48 (1974); Comment, The
Constitutional Right to a Preliminary Hearing in Louisiana,35 LA. L. REV.
813 (1975); Note, 36 LA. L. REV. 1050 (1976).
47. For an analysis of the inadequacies of present procedures, as well as
arguments in favor of more flexible alternate procedures, see Anderson, The
Preliminary Hearing-BetterAlternatives or More of the Same?, 35 MO. L.
REV. 281 (1970). See also Goldstein at 1166-69.
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defense counsel that often it is bad tactics to disclose the
nature of one's defense at this stage; 48 further, the standard
by which'the magistrate is to judge is by no means clear. 49 An
important additional consideration is that it is questionable
whether, in applying whatever probable cause standard is
deemed applicable, the magistrate at the preliminary hearing
may properly exercise the kind of discretion traditionally
exercised by the grand jury, whether he may properly over50
rule the prosecutor's discretionary decision to prosecute. If
not, the system is deprived of a normative neutral determination as to whether or not prosecution should be
undertaken-a role traditionally performed by the grand
jury. 51 Further, because of the prerogatives of the prosecutor,
his decision not to prosecute is subject to little redress (unless
the press takes up the matter as a cause). 52 The prosecutor in
most states is an elected official and the pressure upon him to
prosecute at times is great indeed. It is submitted that there
should be a better, more effective, independent buffer between the prosecutor and the defendant-to safeguard against
a citizen's being improperly placed on trial.
The French institutions in this area,5 3 it seems to me,
bear consideration. In the simpler and less serious cases,
French investigation is conducted exclusively by the police,
under the supervision of a prosecutorial magistrate (the Procureur de la R~publique), and his decision to put the defendant
on trial is final. Where the seriousness of the offense is of
intermediate gravity and complexity, in addition to the initial
48. See 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 142 at 302 (12th ed. 1974).
49. See LAFAVE, ARREST:. THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 321, 322 (1965); Graham and Letwin, The PreliminaryHearing in Los

Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 636, 689-692 (1971); Goldstein at 1166.
50. See HALL, KAMISAR, LAFAVE, & ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 855 (3d ed. 1969), and authorities therein cited.
51. Id.
52. For a discussion of the existing legal restraints on prosecutorial
discretion, see Bubany & Skiller, Taming the Dragon: An AdministrativeLaw
for ProsecutorialDecision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 484 (1976). See
also Cox, ProsecutorialDiscretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383
(1976); Comment, Private Prosecution:A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
53. See generally Anton at 443; Larguier at 32; Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate (Juge D'Instruction) In European Criminal Procedure, 33
MICH. L. REV. 1010 (1935); Pugh at 1.
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police investigation, usually an independent examining
magistrate (juge d'instruction), at the request of the Procureur de la Rgpublique, must conduct a full investigation.
Thereafter, the decision to put the suspect on trial is to be
made not by the prosecutor but by this independent investigating magistrate. Again, as with the initial investigation
made by the police, a detailed record of all interrogation and
investigations is to be made. In the most serious cases there
is an additional review of the case by three judges of the
court of appeal (Chambre d' Accusation), which incidentally is
the panel to which appeals for alleged improper action of the
examining magistrate during the course of his investigation
is to be made.
There is much in this system, it seems to me, that we
might consider adapting to our own purposes-having an independent magistrate supervise the investigation of serious
crimes to determine whether a suspect is to be put on trial.
Instead of being merely the referee, as is the magistrate at
our preliminary examination, today the examining magistrate in the French system has the affirmative duty himself
to direct the investigation. It seems to me appropriate, here
as in France, for the investigation at this stage to be nonpublic in character, but for the prime suspect to have a wide
range of well-defined rights. Further, in France the examining magistrate can act not only on the initiative of the prosecutor, but on that of the alleged victim as well, and we in
the United States may well have gone too far in divorcing the
54
victim and his family from the criminal process.
We should, I feel, give serious consideration to instituting
an examining magistrate system as an alternative to the
grand jury. Perhaps, to introduce greater citizen participation than that found in France, we should have a small panel
of citizen jurors (three or five) sit with the examining magistrate in both the investigating and decision-making processes, or perhaps only in the latter. Instituting an examining
magistrate system would work well with the suggested alternative to the present plea bargaining or plea discussion system, discussed later. True, it would constitute a considerable
departure from our traditional system. I should think, how-

54. See discussion on victim compensation and redress in text at note 77,
infra.
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55
ever, that its adoption by a state would be constitutional,
and it might well bring with it both more protection for the
accused and greater efficiency in investigation-a combina' '56
tion "devoutly to be wish'd.

SHORTER AND

SPEEDIER TRIALS;

BROADER AND SPEEDIER

APPEALS

One of the most glaring deficiencies in the American system is the inordinate delay so often involved in bringing a
person to trial. Unfortunately there seems to be undue delay
in the French system as well as our own. The reason for the
delay in France, however, appears to be somewhat different,
for in France defense counsel are generally unable effectively to delay proceedings. The pre-trial delay there is
largely attributable to insufficient personnel.
With us, in addition to the delay caused by docket congestion, insufficient personnel, etc., pre-trial delay is often attributable to the delay tactics of defense counsel, for it is very
57
often in the interest of the defendant to postpone trial.
Hence, pre-trial delay in our system is often a result of the
excesses of the adversary system, and for us to permit defense counsel thus to provoke delay is to permit a perversion
of the system. As Mr. Justice Powell has pointed out, it is the
public which often has the most acute interest in the defendant's being brought to trial speedily whether he wants it or
not.58 The trial court, it is submitted, should be given power
and responsibility for moving the docket along and seeing to
it that each defendant will have a fair and speedy day in
court-unless the case is definitely dropped by the prosecution, or the defendant pleads guilty. This becomes especially
evident when it is remembered that in many American jurisdictions defense of the indigent (the major criminal defense
effort) is centered in a single public defender office. The power
of the public defender to "gum up" the system by effectively
intensifying delay tactics, must be radically curtailed.
55. A defendant in a state court proceeding thus far has no Federal
Constitutional right to a grand jury indictment. Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884).
56. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act III, Scene 1.
57. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
58. Id. at 520. See also the discussion in the legislative history of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 4 U.S.C.C.&A.N. 7401, 7408 (1974).
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To the extent pre-trial delay is caused by absence of
prosecutorial or judicial personnel and facilities, these must
be speedily provided as high priority items. Modern management methods are much needed. To the extent delay is attributable to creaky machinery and outmoded methods, we as
a profession must accept responsibility and eliminate the delay. The courts, I feel, must insist on the early realization of
this most fundamental aim. The United States Supreme
Court by its 1972 promulgation of Rule 50(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure5 9 took a very salutary step. Not
content with this development, Congress by its Speedy Trial
Act 60 (enacted January 3, 1975) requires even stronger implementation. The influential American Bar Association
Standards on Speedy Trial6 ' also provide stimulation to celer62
ity, and there is movement in the states too in this direction.
In addition to the undue length of time involved in pretrial maneuvering, it is submitted that our trial itself often
consumes inordinate time. As noted above, the French trial is
usually a very short, quick affair; for many well-rooted
reasons, our trial must often be much longer and more elaborate. Recently, however, there has been a lamentable tendency to extend the length of our trials, especially in the
so-called "big criminal cases."
If we consider the time, expense and drain on resources involved in two-week, month
long or even nine-month long trials, it must be recognized
that in fact such lengthy trials are absorbing the time and
resources the system otherwise would be allocating to the
run-of-the-mill cases-that because of these long drawn-out
trials, the pressure on the prosecutor to plea bargain in other
cases is concomitantly increased.
This is not to suggest that the trial judge should play the
dominant role at trial that he does in France, but he should, I
feel, accept responsibility for seeing to it that the framework
for trial combat is fair, adequate, and reasonably speedy. The
59. Amended Rule 50(b) went into effect Oct. 1, 1972.
60. Pub. L. 93-619, Title I, § 101, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2076.
61. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (1968).
62. See 4 U.S.C.C.&A.N. 7401, 7405 (1974). For a discussion of recent state
action in this area, see Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Ohio Follows the
Trend, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 610, 616-18 (1974).
63. As an exaggerated example, the recent "Zebra" trial, which concluded in San Francisco recently, took over one year. New York Times, March
15, 1976 at 27, col. 2.
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overall "system," represented by the judge, has a responsibility, not only to those presently on trial, but also to those
waiting in the wings, to see to it that jurors are quickly and
fairly selected, and that the trial proceeds with dispatch. The
presiding judge, it is submitted, should assume much more
than the role of a passive referee, and doing so is in no sense
in conflict with our Anglo-Saxon heritage.6 Within appro65
priate limits, the judge should be free to question witnesses
66
and comment on the facts, to prevent repetitive and unnecessarily cumulative testimony. 6 7 If, as suggested above,
both defense and prosecution have copies of pre-trial impartial police investigative reports, this, coupled with broader
responsibility upon the trial judge to see to it that trial time
is not frittered away, would expedite matters.
It is surprising to an American to realize that for all
except the most serious offenses, the French give a much
broader right of appeal then do we."' With this exception, the
French afford a full appeal on fact, law and sentenceincluding the right to submit new evidence. The reason this is
feasible in France is that except as to the most serious cases
there is no jury, and trials and appeals are both very short.
The writer is in no sense suggesting that we give as wide
a review as the French; it would seem quite infeasible in our
system. Nonetheless, I feel a defendant should be able to
secure a reversal on the facts if his conviction is clearly not
supported by the record. Further, it seems unconscionable
and most unwise for us not to afford an appeal as to sentence, 69 and yet this is the traditional view in the Anglo64. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 784 at 188 (Chadburn rev. 1970).
65. This is fully authorized by FED. R. EVID. 614. See the discussion in
the Advisory Committee's Notes.
66. See ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 8 and comment thereto.
See also Rule 105 of Fed. R. Evid. as originally promulgated by the Supreme
Court, 56 F.R.D. 183, 199 (1972), together with Advisory Committee's Notes.
The Rule as promulgated, however, was not adopted by Congress.
67. See FED. R. EVID. 611.

68. See Pugh at 45.
69. Chief Judge Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit, United States Court of
Appeals, has stated: "The United States stands alone in allowing a single
judge to set the minimum sentence according to his own dictate." United
States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764, 767 (4th Cir. 1964). For a discussion of the
interrelationship between appellate review of sentence and the development
of appropriate sentencing standards see Pugh and Carver, Due Process and
Sentencing; From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEX. L. REV. 25, 42 (1970).
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American system.7 0 About half of the states afford sentence
review, 71 and recent federal cases indicate greater willingness
7 2
of federal courts to review federally imposed sentences.
In considering our criminal appeals, one must necessarily
consider the inordinate delays incidental thereto. For example, the average time lag involved in a criminal appeal in the
California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District in
1970 was over sixteen months, 73 and the median time lag in
the United States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia in 1974 was over thirteen months. 74 Such delays in criminal justice cannot properly be tolerated; sufficient personnel
and resources must be allocated to resolve them.
VICTIM COMPENSATION AND REDRESS

One of the contributing causes, perhaps, of the increase in
American crime is the depersonalization of modern urban life,
so that to the offender the victim is often more a symbol or a
thing than a person. Studies have indicated that an important aspect of rehabilitating the criminal is bringing him to
realize the personal harm he has effected, and in addition, to
feel that somehow he has thereafter made restitution for the
Of great significance, the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
recently approved rules providing for greater regulation of trial courts' sentencing procedure, including a requirement that a judge must explain on the
record reasons for each sentence he imposes. The new rules suggest also that
a presentence conference be held with the prosecutor, defense attorney and
probation officer to consider both the relevant factors affecting the sentence
and possible sentence alternatives. New York Times, March 18, 1976, at 37,
col. 4.

70. See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL §
533 at 450-56 (1969).
71. In 1972, 26 states were listed as affording a measure of appellate
review of sentencing. Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17
ST. LOUIS L.J. 221, 252 (1972).

72. See United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972), noted at 7 SUFF. U.L. REV.
1128 (1973); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). See also 2 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 533 at 450-56
(1969).
73. Christian, Delay in Criminal Appeals: A Functional Analysis of One
Court's Work, 23 STAN. L. REV. 676, 677 (1971).

74. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1974 at 376 (1975). The overall median the
same year for United States Circuit Courts of Appeals in criminal cases was
7.8 months.
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harm.7 5 We have perhaps gone much too far in separating the
civil and criminal aspects of wrongful acts.7 6 It is very interesting that in France 7 7 and in a number of other countries, 78 the victim, if he chooses, may become a party to the
criminal proceeding, and in the same proceeding be awarded
damages for the wrong he has sustained. This is very common
practice in France, and sometimes the interest of the civil
party is clearly dominant over that of the state. It is said that
French appellate courts reviewing criminal proceedings
spend approximately 70%7 9of their time on the civil aspects of
the criminal proceedings.
The writer does not go so far as to urge such fusion in the
United States, but it might well be salutary to provide, for
example, that before a defendant is sentenced, and especially
before a plea bargain is finally arrived at, the victim should
have the right to be heard. Perhaps there should be further
development and utilization of restitution as part of the criminal sentence itself.80 Further, as in South Africa,8 1 it might
well be that at the conclusion of a criminal proceeding
(whether it be a trial or a proceeding at which a guilty plea is
received) the victim should be permitted, at the discretion of
75. See SCHAFER, THE VICTIM AND HIS CRIMINAL (1968) [hereinafter cited
as SCHAFER]; Schafer, Compensation of Victims of Criminal Offenses, 10
CRIM. L. BULL. 605 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Compensation of Victims];
Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1965).
76. For a discussion of the historical development in Anglo-American law
and Western Europe generally, see Schafer at 7-38; Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MINN. L. REV. 223 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wolfgang].
77. See Howard, Compensationin French CriminalProcedure,21 MOD. L.
REV. 387 (1958); Larguier, The Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal
Procedure, 39 TUL. L. REV. 687 (1965); Pugh at 1.
78. See Murray, A Survey of Criminal Procedure in Spain and Some
Comparisons with Criminal Procedure in the United States, 40 N. DAK. L.
REV. 7 (1964); Pugh, Aspects of the Administration of Justice in the Philippines, 26 LA. L. REV. 1 (1965); Pugh, Aspects of the Administration of Criminal Justice Under the Law of South Africa: Notes and Comparisons by An
American Observer, 19 Sw. L.J. 693 (1965); Compensation of Victims at 60914; Wolfgang at 229-31.
79. Larguier at 688.
80. See Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional
Aim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1965); Wolfgang at 229.
81. See Pugh, Aspects of the Administration of Criminal Justice Under
the Law of South Africa: Notes and Comparisons by An American Observer, 19
Sw. L.J. 693 (1965).
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the court, to introduce evidence pertinent to defendant's civil
liability. Then after a hearing, and on the basis of the entire
record, the victim could be awarded a judgment as to restitution and damages.8 2 In the usual run of cases this might be a
very salutary, expeditious, inexpensive proceeding (for both
defendant and victim)-enabling the victim to receive some
sort of financial and psychological satisfaction.
Furthermore, perhaps we in the United States afford the
victim insufficient means of controlling prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute.8 3 In France,8 4 England,8 5 and a number
of other countries8 6 the victim himself, under certain circumstances, may institute criminal proceedings. It is submitted we should consider establishing more effective methods of
controlling and reviewing a district attorney's decision not to
prosecute.
A NON-ADVERSARY ALTERNATIVE TO TRADITIONAL TRIAL
AND SENTENCING PROCEDURES

As noted above, the overwhelming majority of convictions
result not from trials, but from guilty pleas. These guilty
pleas in turn result in the main from negotiations between
defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney. Although very
important safeguards have recently been established to protect defendants against ill-considered guilty plea forfeiture of
fundamental constitutional rights,8 7 much more, it is submitted, needs to be done. The plea bargaining process itself still
remains relatively unregulated and unsupervised; the
numerous procedural regulations that govern our trial and
pre-trial motion procedures are absent here. Since trial and
pre-trial motion practice are subject to public scrutiny, argu82. This, of course, is quite different from programs for governmental
compensation to victims of crime. For a discussion of the latter see S. 300, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and Yarborough, S. 2155 of the Eighty-ninth
Congress-The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, 50 MINN. L. REV. 255
(1965).
83. See Cox, Discretion-A Twentieth-Century Mutation, 28 OKLA. L. REV.
311, 313-24 (1975), LaFave, The Prosecutor'sDiscretion in the United States,
18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970).
84. See Pugh at 12.
85. See Sullivan, A Comparative Survey of Problems in Criminal Procedure, 6 St. LOUIS U.L.J. 380, 382 (1961).
86. See Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecutionand Disposition of
a Criminal Case, 28 VAND. L. REV. 931, 978-80 (1975).
87. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, as amended by 89 Stat. 371, 372 (1975).
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ably they need less detailed regulations than does the plea
negotiation process. Further, rather than being subject to the
contemporaneous guiding, neutral hand of the judge, as are
the trial and pre-trial motion procedures, the plea negotiation
process is generally left to defense counsel and the prosecutor. This, it is submitted, is especially dangerous where
defendant himself is often quite uneducated, as he usually is,
and both defense counsel and prosecuting attorney are woefully overworked, as is normally the case. One must question
whether at present improper factors may well enter the bargaining process.
Presumably the goal of the judicial process is justicejustice in its fullest meaning-with the myriad philosophical
and practical aspects that enter into crime and punishment.
Instead of such ethereal factors, a prosecuting attorney often
may have much more practical personal problems of immediate concern-not only his crowded docket, but also the
pressures brought by the press, the victim and his family and
friends, and the defendant and his. Similarly, defense counsel,
especially the public defender, may be overcome by the press
of numbers, the desire to establish a principle, or achieve a
modus vivendi with his likewise overworked opponent. What I
am trying to say is that in the practical bargaining process
between defense counsel and prosecuting attorney, all of society's legitimate interests may not be sufficiently represented.
Extraneous inappropriate influences may too often inject
themselves. This is not to question the motives and good
intentions of the vast majority of the participating professionals; instead, it is to urge that if we are to be true to the
notion that ours is a government of laws and not of men, then
the plea negotiation process must be subjected to far more
societal regulation. It is submitted that it is insufficient simply to regulate the judicial reception and scrutiny of a bargain previously arrived at via unsupervised negotiations. If
society is to control the plea bargaining process, the process
itself must be far more open. In addition, and here I differ in
part with very forward-looking minimum standards proposed
by the American Bar Association,"" and the generally salutary amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,8 9 I believe the entire bargaining process should be sub88. ABA STANDARDS

RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.3 (1968).

89. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Also, under the recently approved UNIFORM
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ject to the active contemporary supervision and control of the
judge. The judge as the neutral nonpartisan is less subject to
public pressures, less harried by docket congestion, and hence
generally able to be more concerned about even-handed
abstract justice. What the writer wants is more, not less,
judicial control.
If, as previously urged, we develop impartial, more effective investigatory procedures, and broad discovery and disclosure requirements, plea bargaining procedures would be
much safer, provided the process is adequately supervised by
the court. The factual basis for both the guilty plea and any
lighter sentence imposed would be made more evident.
Further, if we adopt something akin to an examining magistrate, he would be an ideal person to supervise or direct plea
bargaining procedures.
Under our present system, when a person elects to go to
trial and contest guilt, the system's energies naturally focus
upon the question of guilt or innocence. For the majority of
those convicted, however-most of those now electing the
guilty plea route-the fact of guilt is relatively clear, and the
critical question, both for the accused and society, is what
should be done with the defendant, or to him, or more ideally,
for him. The present plea negotiation approach is ill-adapted
to resolve this question satisfactorily. The present bargaining
process too often juxtaposes the wrong values. On the one
hand, society gives up the opportunity for a harsher penalty,
and defendant gives up his chance to go "scot free." How
much each is willing to yield depends upon the strengths and
weaknesses of the case and the adversaries. As fine as the
adversary system is as a fact-finding device when the question is guilt or innocence, is it reasonable to believe that it
yields equally salutary results where the question is what
ought to be done with a guilty defendant? Are we to believe
that the most just result is to be reached by bargaining as to
whether the prosecution is to yield so many "pounds of flesh"
for defendant's relinquishment of his constitutional right to a
fair trial and all of its safeguards?
The writer doubts the efficacy of the adversary system in
this context, and proposes instead that defendant be permitted to opt out of the traditional plea bargain/trial option sysRULES OF CRIM. P. 441 (1974), a judge is prohibited from participating in
discussions re guilty plea agreements.
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tem and into a judge-run proceeding in which the fundamental issue would be what in justice should be done with this
human being. At such a hearing, defendant would, of course,
be represented by counsel, as would the prosecution, but the
role of counsel would be to develop-in an expedited public
hearing-evidence and argument bearing on what should be
done with the defendant.
A real problem in formalizing a non-adversary alternative to trial is that a defendant deciding whether or not to
elect the non-adversary proceeding would be quite reticent to
do so unless he first were assured of the benefits to be derived
therefrom. Just as in existing plea bargaining, he would be
unlikely to forfeit his right to trial without first being given
an inducement-explicitly or implicitly. This real problem
could be met if the broad pre-trial impartial investigation
urged above were adopted, for in such event, a judge (the
examining magistrate if such be ultimately accepted) could,
after reviewing the file, state what would be the maximum
penalty defendant would face if he elected the non-adversary
route. This would, it is hoped, provide adequate inducement
for many guilty defendants appropriately to elect the nonadversary alternative. This proposal is very similar to a recently adopted French procedure relative to certain minor
criminal infractions." Although, as noted above, the French
generally do not have plea bargaining or guilty pleas, in very
minor cases there is now a procedure by which a judge, after
having studied the investigative report, may stipulate the
fine that would be imposed if the defendant chose to accept
this non-trial option.
If the above proposal were adopted generally in this
country, a defendant would not be forced either to buy a "pig
in a poke" or go to trial. If he elected the non-adversary
hearing, the maximum sentence initially indicated would not
necessarily be the sentence later imposed; it would merely be
the maximum possible sentence. The court, in a nonadversary hearing, unencumbered by technical rules of evidence, 9 1 would seek as best it could to determine what should
be done-not simply to the defendant, but for him and society.
90. French Code Civ. P. art. 524-528(2), as amended by Law no. 72-5,
January 3, 1972.
91. The technical rules of evidence are not applicable in sentence proceedings. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); FED. R. EVID. 1101.
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If, on the other hand, a defendant elected the traditional
adversary route, he would go to trial and there be accorded
all the usual constitutional rights; if convicted, he should
92
then be afforded a meaningful sentence hearing.
There is, of course, a danger that the proposed system
might be used to bludgeon a defendant into forfeiting constitutional rights, but this danger under the existing system, it
is submitted, is even greater. Admittedly the proposal contains a built-in inducement for a defendant to give up his
constitutional right to trial, and this is clearly questionable.
The writer feels, however, that the American Bar Association
is right in suggesting that there is justification for "going
lighter" on a defendant who is willing to admit his guilt 93 and
forego trial. If the proposed non-adversary alternative approach be adopted, plea bargaining between adversary attorneys should be outlawed. In its place, a defendant choosing to
admit his guilt and accept a non-adversary alternative to
trial would have the benefit of a judicial inquiry as to what in
justice should be done with him. Although the hearing would
be non-adversary in the traditional sense, both the prosecution and the defense would be invited to bring forward as
much pertinent data as they wished relative to the cause. The
basic responsibility, however, for ascertaining pertinent facts
and fixing the most appropriate sentence would be upon officials charged with making a pre-sentence investigation and
upon the court. That the ultimate sentencing decision is
properly a judicial prerogative is generally accepted in our
system, and the institution of plea bargaining has, it is submitted, made inappropriate incursions upon this principle.
Realistically and functionally viewed, the present system
often permits the prosecution and defense counsel by plea
bargaining to determine sentence. The proposal would return
the sentencing determination to its proper place, the court.
CONCLUSION

For generations we in America were serene in the
confidence that our criminal justice institutions were the best
of all possible and that there was little to learn from others.
92. See in this connection the very important safeguards recently approved by the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals discussed at
note 69, supra.
93. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.8 (1968).
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Fortunately we are now shaken from that state of selfsatisfaction. Whether or not the foregoing ruminations and
proposals have merit, the writer is totally convinced that we
should be spending mor6 time considering the criminal justice
systems of other countries. Parts of our own are much in need
of re-examination, revitalization, and reform. Especially deserving of reappraisal, it is earnestly submitted, is our institution of plea bargaining and guilty pleas. Although the
recent reforms in this area have been very helpful, much
more fundamental changes are in order.

